




in the Presence of a Dominant Firm
??????? ?
The retail trade today in increasingly dominated by large, centrally
managed power retailers. In this paper, We develop a channel model
in the presence of a dominant ¯rm to examine how a manufacturer
can best coordinate such a channel. Our results show that if one
retailer has the channel power to determine its assortment ¯rst, then
it can strategically reduce its assortment by carrying only the popular
variety while simultaneously inducing the rival retailers to carry both
the specialty and popular varieties. The rival retailer then bears higher
assortment costs, which leads to relaxed price competition for the
commonly carried popular variety. Therefore, the manufacturer must
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??????????????f · H s(2®+ s)????? f ????????
??????????????????????
¸¤ = 1; ¦¤(s; f) = (®+ s)2=4¯ ¡ f;







p(w; s; f) = (®+ s+ ¯w)=2¯
¦d(w; s; f) =
H
(®+ s+ ¯w)2=4¯ ¡ f
????
????????????????????¦d(w; s; f) ¸ ¦d(w; 0; 0)??
? w · ws ????????????????????
ws = f
H




? ??????? 0 · f · ® H s=4¯ ????
p = 3(®+ s)=4¯; ¦m = (®+ s)
2=8¯; ¦d =
H
(®+ s)2=16¯ ¡ f
? ??????? ®
H





s2 ¡ 4¯f)=4¯ H s
¦m = (4¯f +
H
s2)fH s(2®+ s)¡ 4¯fg=8¯(H s)2
¦d = (
H





s(2®+ s)=4¯ < f · H s(2®+ s)=4¯
????
p = 3®=4¯; ¦m = ®

















t(q; f) = f(H ¡k1)= H gf(®+ s)=¯ ¡ q= H ¯g ¡ (1¡ k2)f=q(1)










H ¡1)=(2N H + H ¡1)
k2
¤ ????
0 · f · k1¤fs(2®+ s)g=4¯????? k2¤ = 1
k1





















????????????????Fi ¸ 0???????wi ¸ 0??????
???????????
? 1??????????????
? 0 < f · (® H s)=4¯ ???? Fc = 0
? (®
H
s)=4¯ < f · H s(2®+ s)=4¯ ???
?? Fc = (1¡
H
)(®+ s)(4¯f ¡ ® H s)=4¯N H s
? 2??????????????
? 0 < f · (® H s)=4¯ ???? Fd = 3 H (®+ s)2=16¯
? (®
H
s)=4¯ < f · H s(2®+ s)=4¯ ???
?? Fd = f4®2(N
H
+
H ¡1) + 4®s(N2 H + H ¡1) + 3N H s2g=16¯N
?? ¡ff2¯fN + s[2®(¡1 + H ) + s(N H +2 H ¡2]g=2N H s2
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